The twenty-first century is increasingly an era of protracted conflict.
the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) described the humanitarian situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a 'protracted protection crisis', as nearly two million people were expected to receive some form of humanitarian assistance, of which nearly 1.2 million were in the Gaza Strip. 10 In this article, we explore the effects of protracted conflict and prolonged occupation through the lens of targeting civilian and environmental infrastructures for the cases of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This work is a part of larger project exploring the effects of direct and indirect targeting of infrastructures in conflicts across the MENA.
11 While a number of studies focus on the targeting of civilians in violent conflict or the long-term socio-economic implications of conflicts on migration and refugees, 12 our focus is on how repeated cycles of direct and indirect targeting of infrastructure undermine livelihoods and human security. 13 As a human rights NGO representative working on Gaza noted, 'infrastructure is an underlying issue that affects everything'. 14 We analyze who targets water, energy, and agricultural infrastructures and how for the period 2006-2017. We further explore how humanitarian actors have responded to the undermining of water, energy, and food security. 14 Authors' interview with representative from human rights group, 9 Aug. 2017; Jan Bachmann and Peer Schouten, 'Concrete approaches to peace: infrastructure as peacebuilding', International Affairs, 94: 2, 2018, pp. 381-398. 15 For detailed, full-color maps and additional information on the database, see https://sites.nicholas.duke.edu/time/. The authors' Coding Handbook and coding of the data used in this article are available upon request.
Palestinian territories, the database includes 982 discrete incidents of state and non-state actors targeting infrastructure, drawn from published news articles, UN documents, and human rights reports, from 2006 to 2017. 16 The analysis draws on 28 interviews with NGOs, humanitarian and development assistance actors, and government officials in Israel, Geneva, and East
Jerusalem in 2017 and 2018, as well as aggregate accounts of infrastructure destruction compiled by the UN, public utilities, and human rights groups.
Scholars have devoted significant attention to the effects of Israel's occupation practices on Palestinian livelihoods, human security, and water resources. 17 In this article, we expand upon this body of work to explore how the targeting of infrastructure has hindered access to basic services and undermined livelihoods, and also illuminate how practices of infrastructure targeting have differed in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, we argue that the targeting of infrastructure is a form of 'slow violence' in which the adverse impacts of restrictions on infrastructure development, targeting of infrastructure by settlers, and expropriation of resources accumulate over time. 18 As our data shows, the targeting of infrastructure is conducted largely by Israeli authorities and by the settler population living in the West Bank. The result is that many Palestinian communities have increasingly limited access to water, land, and energy. 19 In the Gaza Strip, in contrast, recurrent violent conflict between Israel and Hamas have resulted in more extensive destruction across all forms of infrastructure. 16 For coding purposes, we break down actors according to the following categories: internal national government, external national government, international coalition, internal non-state group, and external non-state group. 17 Destroying civilian infrastructure under conditions of protracted conflict and occupation produces long-term 'reverberating effects' that disrupt essential water and energy services, leading to adverse long-term effects on human welfare and ecosystems. 22 Food systemsincluding the cultivation, storage, and distribution of crops and food -also rely on the provision of energy and water; when these are absent, food scarcity, malnutrition, and sometimes starvation ensue. Restrictions on movement and prolonged closures of territory limit economic activity and foster 'black' or informal markets. As economic activity contracts, incomes decline, trade collapses, and public service providers receive fewer revenues to invest in infrastructure.
Areas under protracted conflict and prolonged occupation further find it difficult to attract foreign and private investment necessary to maintain or sustain public services.
In Benvenisti underscores how the creation of the Civilian Administration constituted 'the transformation from a temporary to a permanent system' of occupation.
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The other main political actor that has played a significant role in both the direct and or operating a water installation without a license from the area commander. Israel also limited the number of new wells that could be dug. 46 2018. The Israeli government designated Gaza as 'hostile territory' and announced it will follow only the laws of armed conflict, not of occupation. 81 As a result of the extensive targeting of civilian infrastructures during these periods of conflict, we argue that the civilian population of the Gaza Strip has increasingly been treated as a collective casualty of armed conflict.
Map 2 shows incidents of targeting water, energy, and agriculture infrastructure from 2006 to 2017 in Gaza; larger circles indicate repeated incidents at the same geographic location.
Because of the importance of the fishing sector for livelihoods, we include damage to fishing infrastructure as part of the agricultural sector.
Map 2 Here: Targeting of Infrastructure in Gaza
The majority of the 297 incidents documented were nearly split between the agricultural sector (145 incidents, 49%) and the water sector (129 incidents, 43%), followed by 23 in the energy sector (8%). Table 2 water. 83 The Coastal Municipalities Water Utility -the service provider for all water and wastewater services in the Gaza Strip -carried out a water and wastewater infrastructure damage assessment in 2014 which found that water and wastewater facilities located three kilometers from the Eastern and Northern Gaza Strip borders had been completely demolished. 84 The
Human Rights Council (HRC) documented that between July-August 2014, 63 water facilities were damaged and 23 completely destroyed in Gaza, resulting in a significant loss of water access for the population. 85 Likewise, the HRC found that the war damaged sewage facilities, including 60 per cent of the treatment plants, 27 per cent of the pumping stations, and 33, 000 meters of water and wastewater networks, affecting nearly one million people. 86 Consequently, the UN found that 'access to safe drinking water in Gaza through the public water network plummeted from 98.3% in 2000 to a mere 10.5% in 2014, compared to almost 97% in the West Bank'. 87 Gazans rely on purchasing water through tankers, containers and bottled water.
Reliance on these sources increased from 1.4 per cent to 89.6 per cent in 2017, all of which are more expensive and disproportionately hurt the most vulnerable and poor; moreover, the quality of water is unregulated and of questionable quality. Both countries have sought to stop the smuggling of fuel through the underground tunnels into Gaza. 91 In 2013, the Gaza power plant shut down from lack of fuel entirely, with knock-on effects in shutting down water treatment and sewage plants. Fuel shortages from the blockade also limit Gazans ability to use private generators to access electricity.
The reverberating effects of lacking sufficient electricity over long periods of time are one of the most important factors hindering economic development and human security in Gaza,
given the interconnectedness of the water, energy, agriculture, health, and other sectors. Our data further highlights the ways in which the fishing industry has been increasingly targeted: nearly 70 per cent of the agricultural/fishing incidents for Gaza are related to actions taken to restrict access to productive fishing waters. Whereas the Oslo Accords obligates Israel to allow fishermen to go out 20 nautical miles from shore to fish, this has rarely been allowed. In 2006, the area was reduced to six nautical miles, but during periods of conflict, it is often further reduced, such as during the 2008-2009 conflict when it was reduced to three nautical miles.
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Most of the fishing incidents entail confiscating fishing boats. Our data also shows that Egyptian naval forces also target Palestinian fishing boats, by patrolling the southern area of Gazan waters and sometimes firing on Palestinian fishing boats entering Egyptian waters. 104 Constraining
Gazan fishing close to the shoreline rather than in more abundant offshore fisheries depletes shallow fishing grounds; between 2008 and 2011 alone, total fishing catch declined by 90 per cent. 105 The effects on livelihoods are profound: in 2000, 10,000 Gazan fishermen were registered, while as of 2017, only 4,000 registered fishermen were left, half of which were largely unemployed.
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Humanitarian aid and infrastructure in Gaza
The economic and humanitarian impacts of targeting civilian infrastructure have not gone unnoticed by the international community, which has raised concerns about the protection of civilians and respect for IHL. 107 Periods of violent conflict between Hamas and Israel, combined with the sustained blockade, have created dire humanitarian need on a scale not previously experienced in Gaza. 108 Responding to the widespread devastation wreaked in 2014, the Israeli government, the UN, and the PNA established the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM). The GRM was supposed to facilitate and track the entry of 'dual-use' materials (that is, goods with possible civilian and military purposes) into Gaza to facilitate reconstruction, especially for homes destroyed or damaged in the conflict. 109 Interviews with humanitarian actors and donors, however, consistently highlight how restrictions on the import of dual-use goods, including cement, rebar, and aggregate, have taken on a disproportionate role in limiting the rebuilding of infrastructure.
Restrictions and delays on importing water pumps and electrical equipment has limited large-scale development projects vital to the energy, water, and health sectors. A representative from a humanitarian organization, for example, described the difficulty of importing water pipes, which delayed nearly 30 water and sanitation projects as of 2017. 110 EU staff also reported in interviews that if a particular type of material is rejected, then they are not allowed to submit a request for the same material again.
111
The long chain of bureaucracy that humanitarian actors must navigate, even in spite of the GRM, not only hinders reconstruction, but further institutionalizes the blockade on Gaza. In both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, we have found that Israeli control over infrastructure, construction, land use, and movement undermines civilian welfare even as these effects are 'walled off'-literally and in public discourse--from the Israeli public and
